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SUMMARY 
Safety engineering has long labored under the assumption that 
the worker, and not the situation, is the cause of most serious indus­
trial accidents. Only in recent years, has any serious attention been 
paid to the part played by the hazards that are inherent in an opera­
tion. Even less work has been done in any attempt to measure these 
hazards and determine their injury causing potential. In this study, 
a method was developed by which the safety engineer could use his 
historical accident data to evolve a hazard rating plan, capable of 
evaluating the hazard potential of an operation. 
The procedure used in developing the Hazard Potential Rating 
Form is relatively simple and is dependent upon the data that is 
present in the files of any industrial safety department. Both the 
per cent contribution of a hazard to the overall injury rate and the 
average cost per accident due to that element are considered in the 
final analysis. These two indicators of accident importance have 
been balanced with each other to be used in applying weights to the 
individual hazard that is being considered. The completed rating form 
is the collection of all relevant hazards and is comparable in form 
to the job evaluation point rating evaluation sheet used by many com­
panies. An example rating form has been developed, using sample data, 
to demonstrate the procedure used to arrive at the final evaluation form. 
This method can be used to develop a comparable rating plan for any 




The primary objective in using the Hazard Potential Rating 
Form is to provide an objective basis by which one operation can be 
compared to another as to its potential for causing serious injury. 
The result of each individual evaluation will be a point rating which 
can be used in such a comparison. The results of such evaluation will 
be used to direct the attention of the safety engineer to those areas 
which have the greatest potential for causing a serious accident, thus 
providing a basis for selective accident preventive efforts. The sit­
uation can then be corrected, if possible, and a re-evaluation would 
then be instituted. This review can be performed for all the opera-
tions under consideration at established intervals, or done imme­
diately after a modification of an operation is made and limited to 
only the modified operation. In this manner, it will be possible to 
keep a current record of priorities for safety efforts. 
A secondary objective is to acquaint the safety engineer with 
the relative importance of each type of hazard in the company for which 
he is working. He can also learn the contribution of each specific 
hazard to the overall accident cost figures. This is important knowl­





The field of safety engineering has long been in need of an 
objective procedure by which the injury causing potential of an oper­
ation could be measured. Most safety engineers rely largely on the 
past accident performance of a job to point out its injury causing 
possibilities. This type of evaluation often results in the engin­
eer spending more of his time analyzing past accident records, than 
in trying to prevent future cases from occurring. In some cases, the 
methods have been altered so that past accident records are of little 
use in predicting future performance. The proposed procedure con­
tained in this paper has been devised to force the safety engineer 
into a preventive posture that is attuned to analytical, rather than 
reportive safety engineering. 
Hazard analysis, in the past, depended largely upon the histor­
ical analysis of data. In recent years, several leading researchers 
in the field have tried to introduce more scientific methods of hazard 
evaluation. However, none of these methods has substantially reduced 
the subjectivity in the analyses. Many of the newest methods use ran­
dom sampling techniques which are claimed to introduce objectivity 
into the procedure. Nevertheless, these methods usually allow for 
wide variations in rater interpretation as to what constitutes unsafe 
acts. The field of work measurement has proven the weaknesses of 
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allowing individual interpretations of situations. However, even 
these weaknesses could be greatly reduced by rating the operation and 
not the worker. Most of these proposed sampling plans have based their 
data on the unsafe acts of the worker and not the operation. If the 
reverse were done, more objective results could be obtained, since 
the standardization of terms could be much more easily achieved. 
The purpose of the proposed research is to develop an evalua­
tion plan that will rate the operation, not the worker, as to its haz­
ard potential. It will be assumed that the worker has been properly 
trained and is aware of any safety precautions that have been speci­
fied by the methods engineers. Unsafe acts by the worker will not be 
considered. It is felt that proper training and effective supervision 
is more important in this area of accident control. The major purpose 
of the Hazard Potential Rating Procedure will be to minimize any situ­
ations that are inherent in the operation and could lead to a serious 
injury. Minor injuries and first-aid cases will also be assumed to lie 




An objective and reliable method of determining the hazard 
potential of an operation is of prime importance to the safety engi­
neer. All too often the management of a company accepts a certain 
level of accidents as inevitable, not realizing that many of these 
accidents could have been avoided had the proper tools been made 
available to the safety engineer. H. J. Kolodner states that a dis­
abling injury occurs every three seconds in this country, with a 
death occurring every five minutes (l). Although one is often able 
to accurately determine the direct costs of these accidents, this does 
not provide a reliable measure of their actual value. It has been 
repeatedly shown that the hidden, or indirect, costs of an accident 
can be three to seven times more than the direct costs. If this is 
the situation, then when management states that it can accept a cer­
tain level of accidents, it is actually accepting several times this 
level in many cases. An accurate method of determining the hazard 
potential of an operation is, therefore, required in order to be able 
to focus the attention of the safety engineer on the areas where the 
most improvement can be realized. 
There are three distinct methods of evaluating the hazard 
potential of an operation in use at the present time. The most fre­
quently used method considers the historical accident record of a 
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particular operation. The second of the methods used to determine the 
possibility of an accident is concerned primarily with the use of sub­
jective evaluations. The last method proposes that random sampling be 
used, and has been used only sparingly in the past few years. The ran 
dom sampling method has been suggested to be the most scientific of 
the three methods in use. 
The historical analysis of data seems to be the most popular 
method used for the measurement of hazard potential at the present 
time. John L. Pickens suggests that one of the primary purposes of 
the safety engineer should be to establish an efficient procedure for 
determination of danger areas after an accident or near miss (2). 
This method, however, has its major disadvantage in that it forces the 
safety engineer into a backward, instead of forward, looking attitude. 
There have been recent attempts at using historical data that have 
attempted to diminish this drawback. Two of these methods are the 
"Critical Incident Technique" by H. J. Kolodner (3) and "High Poten­
tial Accident Analysis" by William W. Allison (4). Both of these 
methods attempt to analyze a problem area before it produces a serious 
accident. Again, however, they both tend to foster the identical 
backward looking attitude encountered in the earlier methods. Another 
major disadvantage of the historical method is the fact that it is 
totally worthless in the analysis of a new or revised operation. In 
the fast changing environment of modern industry, an a priori method 
of evaluation is required for effective safety engineering. 
There have been several attempts made to determine a method by 
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which a safety engineer could evaluate a potentially hazardous activity 
before it developed. A. D. Swain has proposed that evaluation should 
begin in the design stage of an operation (5). One should attempt to 
design the operation to be as safe as possible by having a qualified 
safety engineer review the planning of a new operation. There would 
then be periodic follow-up inspections to determine if any hazardous 
conditions have developed after implementation. The suggestion is 
made that it is more important to concentrate the effort on accident 
prone operation and not on accident prone people, since the operation 
is the basic cause of most accidents. There is a disadvantage in this 
method, however, in that there are no actual objective ratings that 
can be applied to these operations that actually demonstrate the haz­
ard potential that is present. 
Robert E. McEldowney Jr. has proposed a method by which histor­
ical data is supplemented by subjective evaluations ( 6 ) . This method 
is termed the "Job Hazard Study." It compares and relates the past 
history of each operation with evaluations presented by the responsi­
ble supervisor and workers. This method, which uses subjective eval­
uations by untrained personnel, allows no objective comparisons to be 
made among differing situations. As of this date no actual objective 
method of rating hazardous potential has been evolved. 
Random sampling to determine the accident potential of an oper­
ation is relatively new approach and has yet to prove itself as a 
reliable indicator of hazard potential. Regal C. Meier, of the Chrysler 
Corporation, has developed a complex sampling system which has helped 
to reduce the accident level of his company (7). It involves random 
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sampling tours by specially trained safety personnel. In all there 
are seventy specific types of hazards that are to be looked for during 
the tour. It also records the number of workers that are performing 
safely as compared to those involved in unsafe acts. As impressive as 
this method seems to be, it still involves the concept of one person 
deciding what is and what is not an unsafe act. Also, it presupposes 
that the major cause of accidents lies with the worker and not with 
the actual operation itself. Although it introduces objectivity into 
the analysis, it still remains that it does not actually rate the haz­




In order to accurately determine the hazard potential of a 
work situation, one must first define the exact causes that could 
lead to an accident. Since each individual industry differs widely 
in its production methods, these causes will vary in their relative 
importance from company to company. In this study, all accident data 
has been taken from the industrial safety records accumulated and pub­
lished by the National Safety Council (8). These figures are not 
meant to be representative of any particular industry, but are used 
solely for the purpose of illustration in the development of the pro­
posed procedure. It is expected that the results that are obtained 
from this study will apply only to those elements of hazard that are 
common from one industry to another. Such elements might possibly be 
manual movements and simple hand tool operations. However, when spec­
ialized operations are being considered, it is recommended that the 
company involved perform its own investigations to determine the haz­
ards to be included and relevant data as to each hazard that is chosen. 
The following is an overall view of the proposed procedure. 
The individual steps will be further explained in subsequent sections 
of this paper. The initial step in the development of the Hazard 
Potential Rating Procedure is the determination of precisely what 
hazards should be included in the study. Once these elements have been 
selected they should be strictly defined in order to avoid repetition 
and overlap. When the definition stage has been completed, the accu­
mulation of the relevant data needed in the study may then proceed. 
The data that is collected is then analyzed to determine the importance 
of each type of hazard with reference to its cost to the company. This 
step is of great importance, since it will determine the weight attached 
to that element in the final evaluation form. All that remains to be 
done is the differentiation of each hazard into appropriate degrees, 
following the same procedure as used in establishing a job evaluation 
point rating system. These degrees of hazard should be adequately 
defined and sufficiently clear to prevent confusion over the semantics 
by the rating individual. Combining these hazards elements and 
arranging them into an order of importance completes the development 
of the rating form. 
The actual development of a sample rating form will now be 
reviewed. All relevant hazards will be included to illustrate the 
overall development of the method. However, only one hazard, the 
manual handling of objects, will be used to illustrate minor or inter­
mediate stages in the development of the proposed method. This is 
being done in the interest of clarification and it should be under­
stood that all of the other elements of hazard will be handled in a 
similar manner. 
I. Selection of Relevant Hazards 
It is necessary that all hazards that could possibly cause any 
appreciable number of serious accidents be included in the study. This 
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will, of course, be left to the discretion of the individual safety 
engineer involved, however this individual should have his study 
checked by an associate in order to verify the fact that every pos­
sible hazardous condition has been taken into consideration. The 
historical records of the safety department is the most important 
source of information for the identification of such hazardous con­
ditions. Questionnaires sent to supervisory personnel can also be 
helpful in detecting possible causes of accidents, especially those 
that are present, but have not yet resulted in a serious accident. It 
is preferable to include seemingly unimportant elements in the initial 
stages of the procedure to avoid overlooking one or more elements at 
this time. Elements can always be dropped with little penalty as the 
study progresses and as their lack of significance is displayed. 
For the purpose of illustration, nine major elements of hazard 
will be included in the development of the proposed evaluation form. 
It is felt that these elements are common to most industrial enter­
prises, and the findings of the National Safety Council seem to sub­
stantiate this decision. 
The nine major sources of accidents that were selected are as 
follows* 




1. Same Level 
2. Different Levels 
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III. Struck by Falling, Moving Object 
IV. Machinery in Motion 
V. Bumping into Objects 
VI. Use of Hand Tools 
VII. Electrical, Heat, Explosive Dangers 
VIII. Danger from Harmful Substances 
IX. Elevator, Hoist, Conveyor Dangers. 
As stated previously, these elements should not be assumed to be all 
inclusive. However, within the scope of this development, they will 
be considered as the sole contributors of all serious accidents. 
II. Definition of Elements 
A complete definition for each of the elements chosen is essen­
tial. It prevents confusion from arising among the personnel who will 
be called upon to perform the evaluation. A complete definition is 
also required for the accumulation of the required data. Since most 
companies do not file accident reports strictly according to the cause 
involved, it is essential for the researcher to be able to correlate 
those reports with the hazard elements that have been selected for the 
study. Ambiguous definitions at this time could greatly affect the 
application of the weighting factor later in the analysis. 
The definitions, themselves, should not be the work of merely 
one individual. Consultations should be arranged between the safety 
personnel, line supervisors, and, if necessary, with the workers in 
order to form a complete picture of all the ramifications of the par­
ticular hazard under consideration. After all the individual hazard 
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elements have been defined, they should then be reviewed in their 
entirety so as to eliminate any possible overlap or repetition. An 
example of the proposed type of definition might prove helpful at 
this time. 
def Manual Movement of Materials 
movement of materials performed by the operator 
during the normal course of the job without 
mechanical aids will be considered as manual 
movement of material. This movement might be 
incurred either directly or indirectly by the 
worker. The movement shall be performed by the 
operator without the use of any mechanically 
operated handling equipment. The hazard must be 
presented directly by the material being moved and 
the consequences of making the move with the mater­
ial. This excludes any hazard that might be present 
had the same action been performed without any 
material movement. 
Several facets of the preceeding definition should be further com­
mented upon. The exclusion of handling aids should eliminate any 
possibility of overlap with both the hand tools and the mechanical 
handling elements that have been chosen. Also, if the hazard were 
present without the material being moved, it would more properly 
fall under the classification of an obstruction hazard which would 
belong elsewhere. As many exclusions as are necessary should be 
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added to the definition in order to prevent any possible repetition. 
III. Accumulation of Data 
The third stage in the development of the proposed evalua­
tion form consists of the accumulation of data for the hazard ele­
ments chosen for the study. The required data exists in two forms. 
The first step is to assign a percentage contribution factor to each 
element. This factor denotes the percentage of the overall accident 
level that is contributed by that element. This information can usu­
ally be obtained from the accident history files of the safety depart­
ment in the company. In the case of a new, or revised, operation the 
required information can be obtained by estimation or comparison with 
similar operations within the industry. If it is necessary to estimate 
the element's contribution, it should be done carefully and after con­
siderable research. 
The second type of data that is needed is the average cost per 
accident that results from the given hazard element. The average cost 
per accident figure is used in order to lend weight to those types of 
accidents that result in the most costly injuries. Every element of 
hazard has certain types of injuries that are common to it. The costs 
of these differing types of injuries can vary widely. This average 
cost figure should be based on as large a sample population as is 
possible. The figures published by a national or industry-wide agency 
should be used whenever possible. However, care should be taken to 
insure that the elements used in the study are comparable to those 
used by the publishing agency. 
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Table 1 contains the percentage contribution factors and the 
average cost per case figures for the elements used in this paper. 
Wherever possible these figures should be obtained separately for the 
permanent total, permanent partial, and the temporary total disability 
cases. This will allow more emphasis to be placed upon those elements 
that might lead to the most serious injuries. A hazard that produces 
accidents with a predominance of permanent total disability cases is 
more in need of correction than one with a history of causing less 
serious injuries. The same evaluation procedure could be carried out 
using the overall accident figures, however, it would tend to over­
emphasize the hazards that have a low to medium total cost contribu­
tion. 
IV. Determination of Relative Severity 
The relative severity of a hazard element is the average cost 
per case figure for a disability classification as compared to the 
average cost per case figure for a temporary total disability. In 
addition to simplifying the data, this results in further emphasizing 
the importance that must be placed on those hazards that cause the 
most serious injuries. It also minimizes the importance of a minor 
disability when compared to a major disability. Table 2 illustrates 
the results that were obtained using the data available for this 
study. 
Several observations should be made about the results observed 
in Table 2. The lower the value for a particular element under the 
permanent total disability column, the less emphasis should be placed 
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Table 1. Per Cent Contribution and Average 
Cost per Accident Data 




















1. Manual 13.9 $15,351 9.6 $1,595 28.5 $348 
2. Mechanical 18.0 14,304 4.3 2,298 5.2 389 
Falls 
1. Same Level 4.8 14,466 9.2 1,950 11.0 331 
2. Different 
Level 12.6 13,394 9.3 3,118 10.2 493 
Struck by Falling 
Moving Object 9.3 12,373 19.3 1,1039 11.1 300 
Moving Machinery 3.1 18,538 19.2 1,353 6.3 230 
Bumping into Objects 2.3 16,888 5.6 691 7.6 154 
Hand Tools 1.5 15,596 8.1 1,012 5.3 241 
Elec, Heat Explos. 7.7 12,766 2.2 1,474 2.6 241 
Harmful Substances 8.2 14,515 1.1 2,074 3,0 456 
Elevators, Hoists 
Conveyors 3.6 13,965 3.8 1,986 1.5 425 
Source: Accident Facts. National Safety Council, 1964. 
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Table 2. Determination of the Relative Severity 
for each Hazard 
Source of Injury Perm. Tot. Perm. Part. Temp. Tot. 
Handling Objects 39.5 4.5 1 
Falls 
1. Same Level 44.0 6.1 
2. Different Level 27.0 6.3 
Struck by Falling Moving 
Object 41.0 3.3 
Moving Machinery 81.0 6.2 
Bumping into Objects 109.0 4.5 
Hand Tools 65.0 4.4 
Elect., Heat, Explosive 53.0 6.0 
Harmful Substances 32.0 4.5 
Elevators, Hoists, 
Conveyors 31.0 4.6 
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on differentiating between the three classifications of injuries for 
the element concerned. The number 109, which is the relative severity 
of a permanent total disability for the element "Bumping into Objects," 
shows a great predominance of serious injuries as compared to less 
serious injuries due to this type of hazard. An extensive analysis 
of this type using the relative severity rates can, in itself, provide 
a valuable aid to the safety engineer. It can point out the hazards 
that should be concentrated upon in order to reduce the total accident 
cost level. 
V. Adjustment of Relative Severity 
In this stage of the procedure the two types of data, the per­
centage contribution factors and the average cost figures, are combined 
to provide a measure of comparison between the individual elements. 
The relative severity figures of Table 2 are multiplied by their 
respective percentage contribution factors. The resulting number will 
be known as the adjusted relative severity of that element. These 
adjusted rates are summarized in Table 3. This process is performed 
in order to smooth the elements so that neither the percentage con­
tribution nor the cost dominates the final evaluation analysis. In 
this manner both the cost and the number of injuries are taken into 
account. Using either of these factors alone would tend to bias the 
evaluation toward certain, different elements. This type of develop­
ment allows the greatest emphasis to be placed on the elements leading 
to the most serious injuries, and yet, it still takes into account 
the case where a large number of less serious injuries might suggest 
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Table 3. The Adjusted Relative Severity 
for Each Hazard 
Hazard Element Perm. Tot. 
Handling Objects 
1. Manual 560 
Falls 
1. Same Level 211 
2. Different Level 351 
Struck by Falling 
Moving Object 381 
Moving Machinery 243 
Bumping into Objects 250 
Hand Tools 97 
Elect., Heat, Expl. 408 
Harmful Substances 262 
Elev., Hoists, Conv. Ill 
Perm. Par. Temp. Tot. Total 
43.2 28.5 631 
54.0 11.0 276 
59.0 10.2 420 
64.0 11.1 456 
119 6.3 368 
25.0 7.6 282 
36.0 5.3 138 
13.0 2.6 423 
5.0 3.0 270 
17.0 2.6 130 
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a higher weight for that element in the final analysis. 
The individual adjusted severity rates for the permanent total, 
permanent partial, and the temporary total cases are then totalled for 
each hazard element. This action produces the overall adjusted sever­
ity figure for that element, which can be used in comparing its impor­
tance with any other element. It is this number that will be used in 
the assignment of the weights that occurs in the following stage of 
the procedure. 
VI. Assignment of Weights to Elements 
The weight that is applied to a particular element is dependent 
upon that element's overall adjusted severity figure. The determina­
tion of the numerical ranges to be used to determine the weights is 
purely arbitrary and dependent upon the values that are being used in 
the study. The range also depends upon the number of degrees of haz­
ard potential that are desired to be present in the final evaluation 
form. In the development of the study now being used the overall rel­
ative severity rates ranged from zero to 631. In addition, it was 
decided that a scale consisting of five degrees was desired for the 
evaluation. The basic scale consists of the numbers zero through four. 
These numbers are then multiplied by the appropriate weighting factor 
for each element dependent upon the overall severity factor for that 
element. The following scheme is used in determining the weighting 
factor that is to be applied. 
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561 or greater 
The use of the above weighting scheme allows all the overall 
adjusted severity rates to be equalized. Each element retains its rel­
ative importance to all other elements throughout the five degrees 
chosen for the final evaluation form. Multiplying each number of the 
basic set by the appropriate weighting factor results in the maximum 
number of points for each of the five degrees of hazard potential for 
a given element. The elements chosen for this study result in the 
weights shown in Table 4. It will be noticed that there is little 
difference among the elements at low levels of hazard, with increasing 
differences as the level of the hazard rises. This allows more empha­
sis to be placed on the high danger areas that might result in the 
most serious and costliest injuries. 
For the safety engineer to be able to assign the correct rating 
points to a particular hazard, it is necessary that there be clear dis­
tinctions drawn among the five degrees employed for each hazard element. 
Some evaluation procedures use a comparison method, where the rater 
uses benchmark operations to make the decisions on points to be 
assigned. This method is felt to be inappropriate in the present 
VII. Definition of Degrees 
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Table 4. Weighting Factors to be Applied 
to each Hazard Element 
Hazard Element Weighting Factor Point Range 
Handling Objects 
1. Manual x5 0 5 10 15 20 
2. Mechanical x5 0 5 10 15 20 
Falls 
1. Same Level x2 0 2 4 6 8 
2. Different Level x3 0 3 6 9 12 
Struck by Falling Moving 
Object x4 0 4 8 12 16 
Moving Machinery x3 0 3 6 9 12 
Bumping into Objects x2 0 2 4 6 8 
Hand Tools xl 0 1 2 3 4 
Elect., Heat, Expl. x3 0 3 6 9 12 
Harmful Substances x2 0 2 4 6 8 
Elev., Hoists, Conv. xl 0 1 2 3 4 
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situation. In its place will be a series of statements or definitions 
about the hazard that will be used as indicators of hazard potential. 
The form of these statements will depend upon the situation that is 
being considered. The degree definitions that have been selected for 
the proposed procedure under study might not be applicable under a 
different situation. However, once the factors have been chosen, it 
is important that they be held constant, otherwise, a completely new 
evaluation of all operations would have to be made. 
The selection of these degree definitions introduces subjec­
tivity into the analysis. In order to diminish the effect of this 
subjectivity, group planning should be used to arrive at the results. 
The safety department can work with the supervisory personnel in deter­
mining the form and substance of these definitions. An example of the 
type of definition required for the form is given below. The complete 
set of degree definitions for all elements is presented in the appen­
dix. The column entitled "max. pts." refers to the maximum number of 
rating points that can be assigned to that degree of hazard by the 
rating individual. 
I. Handling Objects Max. Pts. 
1. Manual 
a. Minimum of manual handling required 
of operation. 0 
b. Infrequent handling outside line of 
normal duty. 5 
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c. Intermittant handling operations 
necessary to work progress. 10 
d. Frequent manual movement of heavy 
or bulky loads. 15 
e. Continuous movement of heavy or 
bulky material. 20 
Once all degrees have been defined, it is but a simple 
matter to arrange all of the hazard elements into the completed 
Hazard Potential Rating Form. The evaluation form should include a 
section that can be used by the rating individual for identification 
of the exact operation that is being rated and for any other informa­
tion that is felt to be necessary. It is advisable to add as many 
identification blanks as are necessary to fully specify the operation 
under study. Otherwise, confusion may arise, especially in the case 
of a large shop where many similar operations are performed. 
The evaluation form for the data used in this development is 
displayed in Table 5. It should again be said that this form is 
applicable only to the data and elements that were used in the devel­
opment contained herein. The weights that were used to arrive at the 
proper maximum point values are only correct for the historical data 
used to develop the present method. They would have to be altered in 
the case of any significant change in either the elements used or the 
data collected. In any case, the method used to arrive at the com­
pleted evaluation form would remain the same as has been proposed. 
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Table 5. Completed Hazard Potential 
Rating Form 
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Handling Objects 
Manual 0 IQ 2Q 
Mechanical 0 5 10 15 20 
Falls 
Same Level 0 2 4 6 8 
Diff. Level 0 3 6 9 12 
Fall., Mov. Obj. 0 4 8 12 16 
Machinery 0 3 .6 9 12 
Bumping into Obj. 0 2 4 6 8 
Hand Tools 0 1 2 3 4 
Elec, Heat, Expl. 0 3 6 9 12 
Harmful Substances 0 2 4 6 8 
Elev., Hoists, Con. 0 1 2 3 4 







DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The completed Hazard Potential Rating Form was presented at 
the close of the preceding chapter. This form is used in much the 
same manner as is the job evaluation point rating sheet. After study­
ing the operation, the rating individual would evaluate each hazard 
element as to its degree of accident potential. The time that should 
be spent in studying each operation beforehand is dependent upon the 
complexity of the operation being rated. However, it should be of 
sufficient duration so that all aspects of the task have been consid­
ered. If necessary, the workers and the supervisor can be queried as 
to any infrequent duties that may have been overlooked. The worker 
should also be asked to comment on the completed rating to determine 
if any important points have not been considered. The completed rating 
form should be reviewed and approved by a safety supervisor who has 
some knowledge of the operation under consideration. Finally, the 
rating and the operation should be reviewed at periodic intervals to 
determine if any situations have arisen that might indicate a re-evalu­
ation is required. 
Although any evaluation procedure is inherently subjective, 
this disadvantage can be greatly diminished through the use of the 
proper definitions for both the degree of hazard and the elements that 
are used. These definitions should be presented in as objective form 
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as is possible. Actual weights, sizes and distances should be used in 
place of vague generalities whenever possible. The rating individual 
should be trained in using objective guidelines in making the evalua­
tion. Eliminating the subjective element from any evaluation procedure 
is not feasible, however, its effect on the final result can be 
greatly controlled if the preceding points are considered in the devel­




The Hazard Potential Rating Form that was developed is not 
meant to be able to handle any and all situations. It was formu­
lated using a restricted sample space as to both elements and data. 
In other situations it might be advisable to consider more hazard 
elements in the study. In another case, more degrees of each hazard 
might be preferred. The range of the adjusted overall severity rate 
that was used to determine the weighting factors might have to be 
altered. However, in all of these cases, the procedure used to 
develop the rating form would still remain the same as has been pro­
posed. 
The number of hazard elements used in the development of the 
proposed method was extremely limited. It is expected that the aver­
age industrial enterprise will have many more hazards with which to 
contend. As more hazards are added to the analysis, the possibility of 
confusion over terms and of overlap increases. The safety engineer is 
required to define the elements and degrees more specifically as the 
number of elements is increased. However, care must be taken to pre­
vent these definitions from becoming so large that they result in a 
cumbersome and unwieldy system of words. The larger, and more compli­
cated, that the definition becomes, the more training and experience is 
required of the rating individual. 
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Before implementing the rating system in any situation, it 
should first be tested to determine its reliability. Several opera­
tions can be selected at random and rated using the derived evaluation 
form. The ratings of this pilot study can then be compared with 
historical performance and personal evaluations to determine if the 
results are consistent with what actually occurs. It is recommended 
that a minimum of five operations be used to carry out this testing 
procedure. The testing study should be performed by the same raters 
who will be responsible for the accepted evaluation study, in order to 
determine if there is any need for further training on their parts. 
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APPENDIX 
The following are the degree definitions that were chosen and 
used in the development of the proposed evaluation form. 
Max. Pts. 
I. Handling Objects 
1. Manual 
a. Minimum of manual handling required of 
operation. 0 
b. Infrequent handling outside line of 
normal duty. 5 
c. Intermittent handling operations 
necessary to work progress. 10 
d. Frequent manual movement of heavy or 
bulky loads. 15 
e. Continuous movement of heavy or bulky 
material. 20 
2. Mechanical 
a. Little contact with mechanical 
handling equipment. 0 
b. Infrequent need of mechanical 
handling equipment. 5 
c. Operates in area where mechanical 
equipment operates frequently. 10 
d. Uses mechanical equipment frequently 
in course of operation. 
e. Continuous use of mechanical equipment. 
Is 
Same Level 
a. Operates in open area with few 
obstructions and non-slip flooring. 
b. Operations in well organized area with 
normal flooring material. 
c. Works in cluttered area with clear aisles 
and normal flooring material. 
d. Cluttered working area with frequent 
movements required. 
e. Cluttered working area with frequent 
movements and slippery floor materials. 
Different Level 
a. Operates at ground level at all times. 
b. Infrequent need to ascend to elevated 
position. 
c. Operates at elevated level with adequate 
safeguards and infrequent moves. 
d. Frequent movement at elevated level with 
adequate safeguards. 
e. Operates frequently at elevated levels 
with few safeguards. 
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Max. Pts. 
III. Struck by Falling Moving Object 
a. Works in area where there is little 
danger from above. 0 
b. Works in area where small, light objects 
might fall at infrequent intervals. 4 
c. Small or medium size objects tend to 
fall at infrequent intervals. 8 
d. Small or medium objects fall at regular 
intervals. 12 
e. Large or heavy objects have possibility 
of falling at frequent intervals. 16 
IV. Danger from Moving Machinery 
a. Operates in area containing no moving 
machine parts. 0 
b. Infrequent visits necessary to an area 
containing moving machine parts. 3 
c Continuous indirect contact with 
moving machine parts. 6 
d. Direct contact incurred with moving 
machine parts. 9 
e. Operates machinery with exposed moving parts 12 
V. Bumping into Objects 
a. Works in open area with no obstructions. 0 
b. Works in well organized area. 2 
c. Cluttered area with clear operating area. 4 
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Max. Pts. 
d. Cluttered operating area with few 
movements required. 6 
e. Cluttered working area with frequent 
movement required. 8 
VI. Use of Hand Tools 
a. Operation requires minimum contact with 
any hand tool. 0 
b. Operation requires use of simple hand 
tools at infrequent intervals. 1 
c Operates simple hand tool as normal 
function of work. 2 
d. Operates complex hand tools at 
infrequent intervals. 3 
e. Operates complex hand tool(s) as normal 
part of job. 4 
VII. Danger from Electricity, Heat, or Explosive 
a. Operates in clear area with minimum of 
exposure. 0 
b. Operates in area where small amount of 
exposure is present 3 
c Operation requires frequent visits to 
high danger areas. 6 
d. Operates continuously in area where 
danger is present. 9 
e. Operates in high danger area with 
inadequate safeguards. 
Danger from Elevators, Hoists, or Conveyors 
a. Minimal contact with each. 
b. Contact at infrequent intervals with 
guarded machinery. 
c. Frequent contact with adequately 
guarded machinery. 
d. Infrequent contact with unguarded 
moving parts 
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